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The ~t uthors test for tln e <1t and crowding e ffects cd uniuns o n Il<>r tuni o n wages a t the indust ry a nd c it y le ve ls. u sing panel dat~t utl Il1e percent organized a nd nonunion indu s tr y and citv l,·;t gc diflcrcJHi~tl . -; c o n s t r ucted from C urrent Popul a ti o n Surv e ys ov er the pn iud 1 9 7~-S :J. r\t the i11du s try lev e l , increas es in th e percent o r g <1niz c d wer·c ~ts s o c i~ttccl 1\' ith d e cr e a se s in the n on uni o n indu s tr y wage dil'fc re nti a l, s u gges tin g that cro wding effects wer e th e predominant uni on e fTt:CI u n n o ntr:Iiun indu st r y wage differentials . In contras t , a t the c ity le ve l in c re ases in th e p e r c ent o r gan iz ed were assoc iat e d w ith in c r eases in the n o nunion c it y wag e differ e ntial , s u gges ting that thre a t e ffe cts pr edom in a ted. Th e author s also find evi d e n ce of n ega ti ve c r oss-o c cupation union effcCLs o n nonunion industry wage differenti a ls , supporting th e ir h ypoth es is th ;t t the indu s try-l e ve l result s were partl y dri ve n b y co rnp le ntetttaritv betwe e n union and n o n union la bor.
T h e two prevailin g mod e ls of the impact of unioni zation on the nonunion secto r a r e the union thr e at model and th e crowding or spil lover model. The union threat m o d e l pr e dicts that an in c re a se in union strength, typ icall y me a sure d a s th e p e rcentage of wo rk e r s in the indu stry that ar e unioni ze d, will ca use nonunion e mploye rs to incre ase th e wag es th ey pay in ord e r to for e stall unioni zation. The crowding model focuses instead on the e ffe cts of spi ll ove rs from the union se ctor to wages in a market-c l ea ring nonunion s e ctor. Whereas th e n on union sector "acts like th e uni o n se c to r" in th e threa t mod e l, th e nonunion se c tor reacts competitively in th e crow ding rnodel. Thus, for e xa mpl e, a higher percentage organized causes th e n o nunion supply curve to shift out, reducing th e wag es o f nonunion workers; that is, the hi g h e r co sts asso ciate d with high e r wages in the union sector re sult in layo ffs of some union worke rs , who, p er h a ps because of th e ir industry-sp eci fi c tr a ining , join th e labor suppl y for nonunion firm s in th e sam e indu stry, puttin g dO\nnv·ard pressure on wages in tho se firm s. Although the thre a t mod e l is typi cally viewed as d esc rib·David Ne umark is Profe sso r of Ec o n o mi cs < ll ivl ic higa n Sta te U nive rsit y and a F< tcttln· Resea rch Fe ll ow o f ! t h e l';BER; iv!i c h ae l Wa chter is the William H. J o hn so n ' Professor o f Law and Eco n o mi cs a n d Director of th e 1 In s titute o f Law and Ec n tt o tni cs <It the Unive rsity o f Penn sy lva ni a . Th ey thank C w; Faucher fot· out.standin g r esea rch ass is tan ce, C h a r les Br o wn. vVi lliam , Di c ke ns , Chri s topher Han es , H a r rv H olzer, A lan Krue ge r , Dav id Le vi ne. and.Jaewoo Ryoo for helpful comments, a nd Dian e 1-!t:t·z for Jli'O\·idin g data from th e Di s pl a ce d Workers Stll've ys . R e se a r c h support was prov ided hy t he In st itute for L:t\\' a nd Economic s, Unive r sity of Pc nn sy lv:lllia . T h e data a n d p ro g ram s us e d in thi s p a p e r ar e a'aibblc fr o m th e a uth o rs up o n request. Vol. 49 , . © by C: u rn e ll U niv e rsity. a a rel ationship betwe e n th e union sec tor
ln tluslria. / and Labo r R elations R eview,
f ·n an industry and the n on uniOn sec tor o ~he same industry, it has a lso been appli e d to the relati onsh ip betwe e n union and nonuni on sectors within g eograp hical regions, most notably c ities.
Economists h ave long d e bated the r e lativ e importan ce of thr ea t an d c r owd in g effec ts. Fri e dman argu ed that "any ris e in the wage rate sec ured by unions for certa in classes of workers \\.C)llld tend to lowe r the waae rates of other workers"' ( 195 1: 2 15-16 ). In contrast, frequ ent ly c ited su rveys of nonunion employe rs have foun d that wages in nonunion firms arc strong ly inf1u ence d by the de sire to avo id unionization (Rees and Shultz 1970; Foulkes 1980; Conant 1959) . The compe tin g views are still refl ec te d in modern labor eco nomi cs an d industrial r e latio ns texts. Reynolds et a !. (1991) con clude d th at thre a t effects prevail, at least for prim ary sector workers: "Not only will the threat effec t be imp ortant but th ere will be littl e spi llover effect in primary labor markets, because th e wage normally exceeds the level needed to clear th e m a rket " (p. 549). On th e other h a nd, Ehrenberg and Smith concl uded th a t the spillover effec t appears to outweigh the threat effe ct ( 1989:566) .
Early regression evid ence sugg es ts that threat effects predominate , leadin g to a positive relationship at th e indu stry level between th e p e rcent organ ize d and nonunion wages . Mo re rec ent evidenc e based on es timated cross-secti ona l relationships between th e percen t organized (a nd o th e r pote ntial proxies for th e str e ngth of the union threat) an d nonuni on wages or wage differentials tends also to suggest that threat effects pred omina te. However, a criti cal limitation o f th e cross-se c tional evid e n ce for testing th e re lative importance of threat and crowding effec ts is that there m ay be unmeasured ch a racteristi cs associated with heavily uni o ni zed industri es or citi es.
In this p a p er, we provide the fir st co mprehensive test of the r e lative imp orta n ce of union threat an d crowd ing effects that exploits pan e l data to r emove the influ e n ce of unmeasu red c haracteristics ass oc iate d with high n o nunion wages, as well as the p ercent organi zed. Th e paper tests for threa t an d crowd in g effects in three co ntexts: within indu stri es, within cities, and across occ upati ons , within industries. Th e cross-occupation a nalysis te sts a third hypo th esis that we introduce to help explain th e within-indu stry effec ts of uni ons on wages in the non u n ion sector, namel y th at th ere are some com plcmcn tari ties between uni on a nd n onunion lab or.
To control for unmeasured characteristi cs associa ted with both non uni o n in d ustry or city wage cliffcren tial s and th e percent organiz ed, we use fixed industry and fix ed city effects in the r espective analys es . T o th e exte nt t h at the unmeasured characteristics are fi xed ove r tim e, this procedure should remove th e bias. The period we u se for the study is 1973-89, a p ar ticularly interesting peri od for testin g un ion effects on the nonuni on secto r b ecause of sh arp changes in th e p erce nt organize d ove r thi s p eriod , espe cia ll y in the goods-pro du cin g sector.
Testing the Strength of Union Threat and Crowding Effects at the Industry Level
The Nonunion Industry Wage Differential Equation
Testing for threat effects req uires a va ria bl e that m easures the magnitude of th e uni o n threat. T he m easure of uni o n strength adopted in the lite ra ture is th e p erce nt o rga ni zed (%o Re ), with a predi c ted positive coeffi cient in an equation exp la inin g nonunion industry wage differentials (w""). Rosen (1969) deve loped the argum en t regarding the perc ent orga niz ed in d e ta il. First, the p e r ce nt organ ize d is like ly to be p ositive ly re late d to th e probability that a nonuni on firm will become uni onized. Arguably, this probab ility increases with the perc ent organized , a lth o ugh thi s is an empirical question. 1 Second , Marshall's laws sugge st that a hi gher percent org aniz e d may le ad unions to raise wages furth e r above their comp etiti1·e len:!, because th e e lasticity of dem a n d for uni o n labor is like ly to b e lo we r in absol tt te ~-~tlll e wh e n th e re ar c fewer subs titution po~s ibiliti es. \Vh e rea s th e nonunion se ctor ··~tcts lik e th e union se ctor" in th e threat llloclc l, the ce rttral ten e t of th e crowdin g m ock! is cl1:1t the n o :tuni on se cto r reacts co mp ct iti n : h·. At th e industry level, work e rs· in d ustrys p ec ifi c human capital ca tt ses tho se 1\·ho ~tr e displac e d fr o m t h e uni on se ctor t() shift in to th e n o nunion secto r o!' th e same indu s try .~ Con se quently, the s ta nd ard 1·iew in th e lite rature is tha t th e re sp on se of w" " to an in crease in % oRe is the reverse of th at in th e th rea t mod e l (fo r ex a m[Ji e, Kah 11 1979; Free m an and tv1e d off 198 1; Hol ze r 1982)
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T h e r e are two exp lan a ti ons for the p r esumed negative effec t of th e p e rcent org ani ze d o n n o nunion wages in th e c r owding m o del. Th e predominant view is that a n in crease in %oRe a cts as a proxy for high e r uni o n wages. Aga in , b as ed on Marshall's laws, unions r a ise wage s more when the perc ent organized is h ig h , sin ce there is less co mpe titi on fr o m the nonuni o n se cJess , for two reasons it see m s reasunab le tu ex p ec t a po sitive relationship b etween the perce nt orga ni ze d and nonuni on wage differen tials in o ur data. if t he thr e at mode l is co rrect. First, "·hi le th e ditTicttl t;-uf u ni o nizing may a ctua ll y incr ea se ~lt \-ery high level s of u ni o niza ti on , su ch a p a ttern hard ly seems to c h ar::tcteri zc UIJioni z::t tion ra tes in the Un ited S tat e s in the sam ple p e ri od. Se co n d, mu c h of th e indi vidu;li-l eve l evid e n ce o n th e u n io n threa t hyp o the sis confirm s, a t le as t to a limi te d e xtent , positi1·e r elatio n ships betw ee n individuals' wages an d th e p erce nt o f th e ir ind us tr y union iz ed .
~S up p l y shi fts out in the n o nunion secto r as lon g as the e lasticity o f la bor d e mand in th e u ni o n sec tor outweighs th e vacancy r a te in the union sector. (Se e Min ce r J 976 fo r a simil a r a rg um ent in t.h e co nte xt o f mi n imum wage effe cts. ) :'T h e ex istin g lite rature suggests tl\·o reaso n s wh y uni o nizat ion may not r e sult in outward sup p ly shifts in the n o nuni o n sec to r. Firs t, und er e ffi c ie nt ba rgaining, uni o nizati o n r es ul ts o nl y in th e reallocati on o f re nts (see Br ow n and Ash e nfe lt e r 1986: Abowd 19 89 : Bro nars c t al. 199 3) . Sec ond , so m e r e sea rch e rs arg u e th at u nion iza tion mi g ht in c re ase t h e productivity of union labo r (Allen 198 4: Brown and Medoff 1978; Cla rk 1980) . tor. T h e high wages , in turn , ca us <: losse s in the uni o n se ctor, a nd th e placed work e rs th e n c rowd into the union sector , causing th e nonuni o n · to d ec lin e.'' An a lter native interpretation consi with the sta nd a rd p r edic ti o n is t h at c h~1 in %o Re re fl ec t mov e Jn ellh of fir ms t tab li shm e n ts from on e sector to the o For examp le , if a h e r eto fore n o nuniun b ec o mes unioniz e d, the p e rc e nt urga r ri ses. If th e res ult is th e esta bli sltm e n union wage premium in the 11cwly ur ize d fi rm , th e firm respo n ds by cu e mpl oym e nt, hen c e s hift ing ou t s upr th e n o nu n ion sector a nd re du c in g w'
Our str a tegy follow s th e rece nt liter: in fir st e stimatin g nonuni o n inclu strv differ e nti a ls an d then stud yi ng th e c minants of th ese differenti a ls (Kru cge ''T h e downwa r d wage pr e ssur e fr om th e sp o f worke rs from the uni on sector to t h e non secto r is presum e d to o utwe igh an y pos i tivc i r es ultin g fr om a shift in labor d ema nd from the sector to competitor fir m s in th e n onu ni o n se 5 Yet a n o ther interpretatio n is th a t v::~1 · i a t %o Re ste m s fro m labo r d e m an d shi fts in th e secto r , th at is, shifts of th e labo r clem < m d rather th an movements a lo n g it. In th is c in c re ase in th e p e rc en t orga ni ze d rell e ch ;l!l t: shift in la b or demand in th e uni o 11 sect or. As \v leave th e n on uni o n sec to1-to find j o bs in the sector, sup p ly shifts inward in the n o nun io n J-esu ltin g in a n in c rease in th e n o nun io n wage e ntia!. We co n sid ere d thi s in te rpr e tation in wo rk (Ne um a rk a nd Wachte r 1993), bu t we fu th e m o re trad iti o nal inter[Jretatio n h e re.
In Ne um a rk a nd ' Wa chte r ( 1993) 1\T a lso, ere d extending th e u sual fra m e work by cu nsi th e within-in d u s try uni o n wage p r em iu m as a ex plan a tory variable, with a predicted positive c ie nt in th e thre a t m ode l (as in D ick e n s I ~186 pre di c te d n egative effect in th e cro wdin g (Ka hn a nd ivlorimun e [1979 ] di sc u ssed a s illl fee t th at can a ris e if hig h un io n wages draw 1101 wo rk ers in to un e mpl oym e nt qu et ies fo r unio r a isin g no nuni on wage s.) Ho wever, im ple 1r tes ts with thi s va ri a bl e is p rob lemat ic , as it is J; b e n ega tiv e ly co n·cl ate d with t h e non u 11io i differe n tia l by cons truc ti o n , so in thi s p ape r str ic t atte nti o n to the p erc e nt orga niz e d . The 1 p::tpcr co n side r ab ly expands on o ur ea rli er p~ analvzing c ity as well a s industry llllltunioJ differe ntial s, a nd b y examinin g nonuni un i1 wage di ffe r e nti a ls with in a nd across o ccup a t tes t th e co mplem e nts mod e l. '' "No nu n ion indu stry wage diffe renti a ls" rere rs lO waue differ e n c es between nonunion worke rs"'in differ e n t industrie s that n : main after co ntrolling fo r individual-l eve l c hara cte ristics (a nd som e tim es finn -le vel c haract e ristics) tkll th eo ry s u gges ts oug ht to b e related to \Vork e rs' margina l prod ucts. ' In cr~ss -sen ion a l stud ies , thi s l\\.< htep approac h has b ee n d efe nd ed_ by Dickens a nd Kau (1~1 8 7a ) as a m t:~m s or avo tdtn g btases in both coellicie n t estimates and stand ard e rrors ar isin g from aggr ega tion (i \ l(>ttlton 1990; Dicke ti s and Ross 198 4). Ccn< tinl y, b e caus e the icl c ntif)' ing information co mes from industry-level shifts in vari a bl es suclt as th e p e rc ent o rg an iz ed, ther e is no <tclcled inforrn ation in th e individual-l e vel da ta. Based on th es e considera tion s , we think o ur res ults are mos t info rmati ve if we use the two-s tag e approach, which asks how union strength variab les e xplain these nonunion indus try wag e differe nti als that others h ave documente d.
We therefore estimate the following industry-l e vel e quation to test the r e la tive stren gth of union threat an d crowding effe cts on nonunion indu stry wage diffe rentials: (1) w "" = a + % oR e~+ fy + E . . An alte rnati ve meth o d of studying threat dlccts is to examine dire c tlY th e factor s asso ciate d with th e r isk o f a nonunio1; finn bein g o rgani zed, a n d th e firm 's react ion to thi s ri sk (Free man and Kleiner 1988).
7 Krucgcr and Summers ( 1988) arg u e d th at such no nuni on indu strv wage d ifferentials o r premia p ose a cha lk nge to purely co mp etit ive m ode ls of wage d e termin a tion, ;mel o ffere d an a rra y o f ev idence sugges tin g that these differentials ca nnot be expla in ed by com pet i tivc m o dels. common year effec ts. H Fo r %c)RG to identify uni o n thr ea t or c rowding effects, the omitted c hara c teristi cs th a t are cor rel ate d with th e perc e nt organ iz ed must be fix e d o ver tim e ; rhi s, o f co urse , is our m a intained assumption , although we al so anal yze the sen~iti\· i ty uf th e r esul ts to the inclu sion o f som e t im c-\·arv ing indu s try-spec ifi c co n troi vari~thlc . ,. A n e q uation paralleling this om: is u se d lO ex plo re intra-ci ty n onu ni on wage v<triariun, a s we ll as intra-industry effecrs acr oss occupat ions.
Pa st Resea rch on Union Effects on Nonunion Wages at the Industry Level Ea rly r eg ressi o n eviden ce rep orted by Rose n ( 1969) s howed a p ositive r e la ti onship a r th e indu stry level b etwee n the p e rcent orga nized an d wages, an d thus su ggeste d that thr ea t e ffects predominate. Ro sen' s data did not distinguish wages of uni o n and nonunion workers . Since th at stud y, a number of papers have r e porte d estimate s o f cross-se ctio nal regressions of nonuni on wages o n th e perce nt organi zed in the worker's indust ry, and other contro l variables (s ee, for e xam pl e, Freeman and Medoff 1981; Podgursky 1986; Hirsc h and N eufe ld 1987) . T h is research tend s to find evid e nce co nsi s te nt with a positive associ ation betwee n th e p erce nt orga ni ze d and n onun ion wag es, although often only for cena i n typ es of wo rk e rs or firms . For exampl e, Podgursky (19 86) found a positive rel ations hip at th e industry le vel , but on ly in large firms, a nd Fre eman and Medoff ( 198 1) found the rel ations hip betwe en the perce nt orga ni ze d among production workers in th e industry and nonunion wages to be positive , but o nly weakly s ig nific a nt. Th e evid e nc e in Hirsc h an d Ne ufeld ( 1987) points more consistently toward th e thr ea t mod e l at the i ndus try leve l. 9 ' T h e fixed year effe cts a lso e limi nate any effects of th e c hoice of the om itted industry in th e r eg ression from wh ich the nonlmion ind u stry wage diffe renti a ls are esr imate d (see footnote I 2) .
''Krueger a nd Summers ( 1988) a rgued aga inst the t hr e at mod e l base d o n evid en ce th a t th e n o nuni o n industry wage stru ctu r e in t h e South has a co rrelati o n of 0.6 with that in th e rest o f the cou ntry, d es pite th e 1 -. the %ewe variab le in r e gre ss io n s for w" " is generally positive as alte rn at iv e indu~rr v c ha rac teri s ti cs are in c lud ed o r o mitte d . ;t lthough it is som e time s n t:g;l ti ve (Co r I1l :lnufactttring wo rke rs) and oit e n s Llli sticdh· in sign ifi ca nt. HO\\"CVC r, so m e of the ot h t:;. correlates of nonunion incltlstr\' w;1trc dif-, " fe re ntial s also appea r to support the thrc ctr m ode l, parti c ul a rl y the p os itive coetli cie ttt o n profita bility, whi c h supports the hypothe sis that th e high e r the p ote ntial rents. tilt: hi g her the wa ge ( Dicke n s 1986). Dickens a nd Katz (1987a ) co nclud e d that "ex isting s tudi e s generally find th a t indu stry union d e n sity is positively related to the e·a rnirws o f ... nonuni o n workers" (p. 63). Th~v recognized, however, that o th e r the o ri es o.f non-market-cl ea rin g wag e s (fnr exa mpl e, Akerlof 1982; Lindbeck a nd Sn ower 1988) a lso pre dict a positive r e lationship b e tw ee n rents and wages. Also, Dicken s a nd Katz note d that it is difficult to sort o ut th e ind e pendent influen ces of th e larg e numb e r of industry characteristics that th ev conside r e d , since industry c hara c te ri s ti c~ are highly corre lated.
A criti cal limitat io n o f th e cr oss-section a l eviden ce fo r te sting the re lative im portance o f thre a t and crowdin g effe cts , wh ic h we a ddr e ss in this pap e r, is that th e r e m av be unm eas ured industry c h a ra c teristi cs ;{sso-c ia te d with h eavil y unioni ze d industries. For example , Kru e g e r and Summers ( 1987 ) a rgued that th e hi s tori ca l eviden ce S LI"-u gests that high-w age indu stri es were a lread y paying high wag e s before the ad ve nt of wid e-scale unioni za ti o n in manufacturin o·
The y note d th a t the Big Three auto make;~ in the United State s were w;we le a ders p r ior 0 .
to becoming unioni ze d. In additi o n , it a ppears that unions h ave te nd e d to co nce ntra te their organizing efforts in indu sfact that %o Re is considerab ly lower in th e Sou th. They d id not, h owever, pro ,;id e a n y evickn ce on whether c r o ss-indus try vari;Hion in %o R<: cxp Ltin s as much o f the cross-industry va r·ia ti o n in nonunion wage diffe r e nti a ls in the So uth as it docs irtt he re s t of th e co un try.
tri e s with high produ c t marke t concentr ation ratio s, that is, in in dustries that h ave a greater a bility to pay high wage s. In n e ith e r of these cas e s would the pr es um e d pos itive re lationship betwee n th e percent orga ni ze d and nonuniOn wages rdlccr a C lli S;l l effe c t of th e percent o rgan izecl.
The Data \Ve es timate n o nunion ind trstn· wa,,.e diffe re n tia ls from loa w;w e r eor· ·-; -;irJ,I1 " "'Sut l·-
mate d for each ve ar u s in u th e Duto·o in cr
ro tat ron gro up annual filc:s of rhe C PS for 1983-89 a nd th e May fi le s fo r 197 3-8!.
1 "
Regress ions were e stim ated se parate ly by r ace and sex, e ffe c ti ve ly rn < lkim• a ll varibl . ,., a es mterac tive with race a nd sex. O th e r variables inclu ded in th e inclivicl u a l-level wage reg re ssio ns we r e industrv d urn m v variable s; nine one-digit occup~tion clt~mm y vanables (with a b r id cre betwe e n t h e ] 9 70 u ancll980 SOC codes); li near a nd quadratic schoo ling ; line a r and qu a dra tic potential experi e nce; dummy va riables for fo ur r egion s; the un e mploym e nt r a te in the SMSA or (for non-SMSA r es id e nts) in the r es t of th e state ; dummy var iab le s for three SMSA siz es; a nd dummy vari a bles for married (spouse pre se nt) and overtime (ba sed on u sual h o ur s wor ke d ) . All s p ec ifications also include a union status (m embers hip ) dumm y variable, and a full set of inte ra ctions of a ll va riable s, includin g the industr'y dumm y variables, with th e uni u n statu ·~ dumm y variab lc . 1 1 T o focus o n co mp et itive market e ffec ts o f union wag e s, we exc lud e government workers from o ur sampl e . lr~ addition , to focus o n workers fo r whotr thr ea t e ffe cts a re mor e likelv to rnatter W{ exclud e man agers, professi~mals, and 'tlH se lf-employed. The coefficients o f th< noninterac ted indu stry dumm y va riable 11 'Th e indi vi dual -leve l r e g r ess io n s arc co ntm Otl i· the li terature , so the results ;ne n o t t-eponcd in th i p ape r. Re sults a r e a vail a ble fr orn the ;uttho rs o rcq uest. 11 l 98:! is orn itt ecl because n o d aL t \vcrc co l Ieete o n union me mb e rs hip that year. Th e clcfirtitiun c union m e mbers hip in th e CPS c han ged s li g lttl v l>\"t th e year-s; Hi rsc h a nd Neu feld ( 1987) pnH·ide d.e 1ail es timate the r1 on u:1i on indu stry wage diffe rentials. v\'e es tim at ed the \\·age differ e ntials for th e e ntire sa mple bv we ighting (by industry and nonunion e mpl oy m e nt) the co effi c ien L~ est imate d fr om sepa rate regr essions by race ~mel g e nder.
1 '
Our lll cas ur c of the p ercent orga nize d is co iJ Strucr u l fr()In the sam e· CPS data. The j 1 rs t p;me l of th e <q; pencli~ ub le provides S\l ll1Il1 <tn· st~t ri stic s for th e indu stry data set, re portin g mean leve ls a nd the 1973-89 chan ges fur nOiluni on in cl ust rv wage diffc rentiah and th e per ce nt org a nized, b y industry and ove rall. The data confirm the we ll-kno wn decline in the p e rc en t organized , especially in the industrial se ctor (for e xample, Linn e man, et a l. 1990 ). The table a lso su gge sts th a t a panel data analysis miaht sh ow a r e lati onship between the perce1~t o rganized and the nonunion industry waae differential quite differ e nt from that sh~wn by a cross-sectional an a lysis . While columns ( l) and (2) indicate th at industries with high %oRe also h ave high w"", column s (3) and (4) indi ca te that. over a ll industries , %oRe and w"" moved in oppo-1 "Jn dustry wage eli !Te re nt ia I:; a re esti mat e d re !a live to servi c es. This r~t i se s th e pro blem that e st imates of e quati o n ( I ) co uld he se n s iti ve to th e o mitte d industrv in the "first-st ag e" indiviclual-lc'· e l wa ge re gressi~ns ft·om which ri\e wa ge diffe r e nti a ls i11 e quati o n ( 1) are es tima ted. To cir c umvent th i,; potentia ] pro blem we in c lude vc a r dumm v va ri ables in equation ( 1) .·Thi s re m o ,·e~ t he in ll uen,ce o f th e o mitte d indu stry, b eca us e the common trend acros,; indu s tries o win g to the cho ic e of th e o mitte d in du st !"\ is ca pture d in th e yea r e ffe cts. The ,;ame iss ue arises with re spec t to cit y wage cliifcrc nriak T o se e h o\v inc ludin g ye ar effect s so lve s the proble m, SllflpOS C tiLl [ in th e fir,;t -Stagc , Cl"OSS-St' Ctional regr ess ion " 'e include cl u mm v ,·a ri ablcs for e ach industry, omi tt ing t h e co n s tant, a nd e stim;nc their coe ffici e nts fo r e~1c h n;a r /1 11 , !J. _, 1 , .... !J A ., . wh e r e !\is the num ber of in du st r ies. Th e seco nd-stage regress ion is then b" = : 1.,,'( .c 
, is a set oh·e ar dumm1· vari ;thl es . \\'e C ll l tr a n sfo rm the es tim;Hcd tl ulllt ni o n wag e differ e ntial s . for e xa mpl e dcfinittg th c tn 1·ei:Hi\·e to servi c es (o r relati,·e to a n an:ragc tlllllil llion \\'age d iffe re ntia l ac ro ss a ll workers) . as in (/Iii-!J,,) = .\it'( + r,.s + Eil. S in ce b,., \·aries on h· IJ,· vctr . the cf'l"ec t <J f s ubtr ac tin g it f ro m the cl epc t;clc ; Jt \;t r ia b le is simplv tu c ktttg e' the es tima ted c ue!Ti c ic·ttl > u f the \'CJr dttmm,· variables , a nd the estim ates of''( ;t re u n afTcctecl .
. site direc tion s twe r th e sample p e riod , a nd some of the industri es with the la rge st declin es in %ewe h ad th e sh a rp es t in cre ases in w"" .
''·
Empirical R es ults
in Tabl e l we n·pt >rt !T suit s fr o m r eg ression csti!llates ul t·qu~t tiuil ( I ) . In a ll case s, we rep ort \YLS cstilll~tl. t:.'i that we ight by the in verse uf th e \<tri <ut cc ul r.he OLS residual s, with the \' <tri~utce cstiiu <tted se parately for e ach industry, pre-an d p os t-19 83. These variance s m ay differ by indu stry because of diffe rent numbers of wo rk e rs in eac h indu stry from whi ch w"" is e stimate d. They may also diffe r pre -and post-198 3 be ca us e, b egin ning in 1983, we u se th e o u tgoi ng ro tation group fil es and h e nce h ave more wage obse rva tion s. v\'e co uld weight exp licitly by the cell sizes us e d to estimate w"" in each industry and year; our approa c h allows for o th er sources of h eteroscedasticity by industry for th ese two p e riods.
14 Estimation without fixed industry effects , in row (1) , indicates a statistically significant po si tive effec t of th e percent o rgani ze d on th e nonunion wag e, co n siste nt with thr e at effects outweighing crowdin g effec ts, and para ll e ling mu c h of the e xisting cross-sectional evidence. When fixed industry effe c ts ar e added in row (2) the estimat.e d c oe ffi c ient of % orzc becomes n eo·a tive and is si<rn ifi cant with at-sta tistic
exceeding four. Th e negative effe c t of %c)RG is the opposite of the e ffect predicted by the threat model, but is cons iste nt with th e crowdin g model. That model sta tes th at a d e cre ase in %oRe causes the nonuni o n indu stry wage d iffe r e ntial, w"", to ris e . To in terp rc t th e mag nitude of th e estimate d co effi c ie nt of % oRe, cons id e r a 14 pe rc e ntag e point d ec lin e in %oRe, which is the ave rag e change for o ur sampl e pe-1 "1 n contrast to th e regress io n est ima tes di sc ussed b e low, th e n o tt Ut tion \\"age differentia ls in thi s tab le ma v be sens iti,·e w tile refe renc e inclu st rv with r es p e,c t to whic h th ese d ifl'c rc nti a ls a r c e s tim.at e cl. 1 · 1 for a ll spe c ifications, rc:.su lts wer e vcrv similar usin g e ith e r JJ!l \\ei ghtul est im a tes o r est i mate s wei o·h rcd ll\· ce ll s iz es.
Manufa cturin g Non m a n ufa ct u r in g -. :? 8
No nindu s tr ia l -.17
Sa m e as (5!) j (.09) ----· --I "S ta nd a rd e r ro rs a re re p one d in parent he ses. WLS est im a ti o n a ll ows a se parate r esidu :li ,·Mianc c for c :1 ch j indu st ry, fo r t h e p e ri od b e for e 198'\ and fo r 1 !:l 83 an d after. There a re 144 obse r vatio n s ex cept " 'htT c ut h t' rwis e i noted. / "The standard clcvi<t ti o n uf th e GNP s kue ,· ari~tb le is .004 .
• ' A sepa rat e p e r ce nt organiz e d va ri a ble is d e fined for eac h su bg ro up of in dustr ies : ~d l ut h e r c ul'lfic it·nts a re J co n s t ra in e d to be the ,;ame for :t il indu s tri es. Source: ,-\uth ors' co mput at io n s base d on Curr e nt Po pulation Surv~v s, 19 73-89.
riod. The coefficient o f -0. 17, in th e context of this d e clin e in % uRC, translates into a 2.4% in creas e in w'" ' . Th e remainder of th e tabl e reports results from num e ro u s spe c ifi cation ana l y~es o f th e es tim a ted rel a tionship betwe en the perc e nt organi zed and n onunion in dustry wa ge differenti a ls, e x plorin g possible o mitted-v a riable a nd e nd ogcneity bia se s, diffe re n c e s a cross subgroup s o f industries , and a lte rnativ e estimation proce dur es . First, a s a crude m e ans o f co ntrolling for ch anges in labor produ c tivity that might affe c t n o nunion wages, in row (3) we ad d a co ntrol fo r I labo r productivity in each indu stry. Thi s is 1 com pute d as th e rati o of th e cu r rent dollar va lue o fGDP (d e fl ate d by th e GDP im p li cit price def1ator) o ri g inatin g in e ac h ind l!Stry to fu ll-tim e eq ui va lent e mplo ym e nt in the indu stry .
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Of course , c h a n ges in Ltbor productivity sh o uld affect nun union ind ustry wage diffe r e n tia ls o nl v if th e c h ;111ges 1 "ln cl u s try-s p ec ific p rice deilato rs are :1\a il able beg innin g onl y in 197 7.
re tleCl \·ar iat ion in factor productivity, rather than var ia tion in labor quality t h a t is captured in the variables includ ed in the first-sugc wage re gressions fr om which t he w <WC differentials are estimated. The es tim :;~ed coeffic ie nt o f the labor productivity \·~triable is pos itin:. as we wo uld expect if product i\·i LV c h <ll tgcs <tre not e n tire ly driven ]J\ ch;\11)-!:eS it t the measure d qua lity or labo r. !-!()weve r . the es tim a te is in sign ifi ca n t, and its i n c l u s ion does not affect th e estinLtted coefficient uf ·1~Utzl; .
Secuncl, itl row ( 4 ) we add a var iab le measur in g c hanges in th e share of GNP contribute d by eac h industry, to attempt to contro l for biases induc e d by ind ustry-specific demand sho cks. 16 T o captu r e industry-specific d e mand sh ocks, this var iab le is calc ul ated as the residual fr om a reg r ess io n estim ated for eac h industry of th e GN P share of ou tput produced by th e indu stry on an intercept, the aggregate civili a n unemploym ent rate, and a post-1 976 dummy variabl e to ca pture the chan ge in acco untin g m e thods u se d in the GNP d a ta reported in the Survey uf Cunent Business.
17
The estimated coeflic ient of %oRe declines in abso lu te va lu e b ut remains statistic a lly signifi cant, a nd the estimated coeffic ie nt of th e GN P var ia bl e is ne gative, co ntr ary to expecta ti o n s.
Th e es timates in rows (1) -(4) assume fi xed indust ry effec ts through o ut the sample pe ri od . vVhil e there is some evid ence that nonuni on indu stry wage different ials a re ve ry stab le (Kruege r and Summers 1988), if the unobserved industry effects are not comp lete ly fixed, this assumption m ay bias the results. T hu s, rows (S) and (6) r e port results using differenced d ata wit h th e differ e nces compu ted over , a lte rn ative ly, a short (o n e-year) and lon g (five-year) in te r-1 ';Fo r exa mple, if nonurrion wages are more flexible t h a n union wages, and hen ce uni on emp loymen t is more var iable than nonunion employment, a downward industry demand shock wi ll r esul t in a dec r ease in w"" a n d a decrease in %oRe. In th is case su c h shocks b ias th e estim ale cl coeffic ient of % oRe uplq rcl.
17 T h esc da ta d o uotdistingui sh between wh olesa le and 1 ·etai l tr ade . va l. F\ icl ence of similar e ffec ts in the sh ort a nd long diffe rence d es tim ates wo uld bolster th e assumpt io n of fix ed in dustry e ffect s. fn ~'<JW (:)), the first-differe n ce es timate of t h e cocfficien t of %or:.c is -.1 9, an d is sraristi c:tllv sign ific mt. The re su lt:;; a r e si111ib r u~: i1tg ~~ fi\·e -y ca r differ e n ce; in row (6). tlt c ( 'Sli m~ltt·d co df~cicnt of % oR<; is -.1 :). ~t11d is ~tl su sut istictil v s i g ni r~cant.
\Jt:q. :t\ 1 h1)t 1gh ]Wrcc nt orga ni zed is u se d as ~lll indcpc nden t Yaria bl e throughout the lite rature tt·~t in g the thr ea t and c rowding mod e ls , it i~ potentiall y e nd ogenous becaus e . fur <:X<l lltpl c , increase.~ in n o nunion wage s m~t y lead to employment decline~ in the nonuni o n sec tor , creatin g a posi~i ve bias in the estim a te of~ in eq u atio n (1 ). 1 
·
In r01\· ( 7), I \'C add r ess this question by instrum e ntin g fo r the p e r ce n t o rgan ize d with its lagged va lu e . Co m pa r ed with th e corre sponding spec ific a tion in row (2), the est i mated co e ffi c i en t is essen t i a II y u nchan ged . Second, we instrum ent for %c1RG with measures of union organi zin g act ivity or m a n ageme nt o pposition to this activity at th e one-digi t industry le vel, taken from National Labor Re lations Board (NLRB) Annual Reports. vVe u se two e lec ti ons varia ble s, the perce ntage o f NL RG r e prese ntation e lc cr.io n s won by union s, a nd the nu mber o r represe ntation e lec ti ons p e r work e r in the ind tt st ry, as we ll as r.he numbe r of unfai r la bor practice clairns against e mploye rs: the LHter two variab les are sta ndardi zed by indu st ry employm ent. T h ese variabl es seem like ly to affect the p r obab ility of unionization, but at th e same time to be "o ne step remove d " fr om simp le employm e nt <tc~justme nt s to wages that may mak e r.h c perce nt o rga ni ze d e nd ogenous. Th e r es ult s, r epo rted in r ow (8) , in dicate a stronger negative re lation ship between the per ce n t orga ni zed a nd the nonunion industry wage d iffe rential, althou g h the estimat e is less p rec ise.
Rcnvs (9) and (l 0) explore the robustn ess of the resu lts fo r subgroups of indu s-1 "C h cz un 1 :tnd Ca r e n ( 199 3) cons idered the cnclogencil,. ur th e perce ut orga n ized in rcgrcssio1r s for uni on \,·ages.
I NDUSTR IAL AND LABOR RELATIO NS REVIE\.V tries, in particular manufacturing versus no nm an ufacturing , a nd industrial ve rsus nonindustrial. 1 (
1 Th e spe c ificati o n fr o m row (2) is a ugm e nted to a llow the coeffic ient of % oRG to differ ac r oss th ese industry subgroups . As th e re su lts indicate, the estimated coefficients of %oRe a re negative and sig nifi cant for a ll subgroups.
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O verall , the results rep o rted in Table l indi cate th a t union threa t effects a re n ot the predominant uni o n effect o n n o nuni o n wage differe nti a ls at the industry leve l. In pa rti cu lar , th e results indicate a robust negative relationship b e tween c h a nges in the percent organi ze d and ch a nges in the nonunion indu stry wage differential. These results suggest that crowding effects are more important than threa t effects.
An issu e th at is worth addressing is whet he r the n egative estimated effec t of % oRe in the within-indu stry regr essi on s ac tu a ll y re fl ec ts c rowding . As noted a bove, the crowding mod e l assumes that a n increase in the p e r ce nt orga nized g ene rate s lower nonunion wage s b ecaus e %oRe is a proxy for hi g h er uni o n wages. Howe ver, it is th e increase in th e uni o n wage pre mium that triggers th e c rowdin g effect. If %oRe an d union wage pre mia a re in fa c t ne gati ve ly corre la ted , our results m ay n ot refl ec t crowding. However, co nfirmin g th e view of % oRe as a prox y for union wages, we find a positive correl at ion of 0.1 3 b e twe e n %oRe an d the indu stry union pre mium , after pa1 ti a lling out fixed industry a nd ye ar ef .. fec ts.
It is still possible, h o weve r, that the n egati ve sign o n the percent organized is due to su lll e e ffe ct oth e r th a n th e crowding effec t. Alth ong h th e e\·id ence d oes n o t p o int towa rd t hreat effects a s the predominant 1 ''T he in dustr ial gro up includes con st ru ctio n, mining, dura bl es manufacturi ng, nondurables man u factu rin g, a nd TCPU . " 0 We a lso ex pl o r ed th e se n sitivity of the res ul ts bv rees tim atin g the spec ifi cation in r'ow (2) dro ppi ng one Indus try at a u me. The e stima ted coefficients o f % oRe ranged from -.05 to -. 23, ave r agi n g -. 17, a nd th e t-sta tisti cs ranged fr om 1.2 to 4.9. The rel ative ly large range of the co efficient estimates is to be exp ec ted g ive n th e r ela ti vely sma ll number of industri e s.
uni o n effect at th e industry level , there ar e possi bl e ex planati on s besides th e c rowdin g e ffec t. Below , we deve lop a n a ltern a tive h ypoth es is based o n com pl e m e ntarity b etwee n union labo r and some nonunion labo r . Like th e c rowdi ng h ypothesi s, th e "compl e ments h yp oth e sis " explains th e ne gative coefti cient on %oRe in the indu stry-level re sults. But it also explains such ne ga ti ve intra-industry e ffec ts across occ upZiti o ns , whi c h are difficult to reconcil e with th e crowd in g mod e L U nion Effec ts on Nonunion Wages at th e City Level
Ne xt, we exa min e union e ffects on nonuni o n c ity wage differentials, rather than nonuni o n in d ustry wage differen tial s. A num bcr of p apers o n th e thr eat and crowding mod e ls, c ited earlier, look at union e ffec ts on n on uni o n wages within Standard M etropo litan Statistical Areas (SMSAs).
One might exp ec t labo r supply shifts from th e uni o n sec tor to the nonunion se ctor to b e more prevalent within c itie s th an within industries. 21 Evide nc e from th e Janu ary 1988 Displ a ced Workers Survey in the CPS ( H erz 199 1) supp o rts this presumpti on . The survey shows th at rou g hly one-half of th e workers displaced between 19 83 and 1988, and reemployed by 1988, took a job in a n ew industry (with th e exception of mining, for which the fi g ur e was o n e-fo urth ) , while on ly a bout o n e-fifth of suc h work e rs took a job in a n ew c ity or co unty. All el se th e same, thi s would lea d u s to ex pect mor e evid e n ce of crowding at th e city level.
Bu t all cis,: may not be th e sam e, sin ce it is ;tl su poss ible: th a t threa t effects a r c strongn wit h in citie s than within indu str ies.
!\tattY u n i()ns. particularly those in th e servic e-p roduc in g se c tor , h ave pmverful lo cal uni ons that organ ize a t th e city leve l. Success in organ izin g workers in one of th e service-p roduci n g indu stri es m ay in crease th e likeliho od or the threat that o th er ser-~H olz e r ( ! 982) m ade thi s a 1·gume n t, 0 11 a priori grounds, in focusing on u ni on s pill ove r effec ts within SMSAs. vice-producing seCLors will become unionized in the same local geographical area. Also, as shown in the appendix table, column ( 4), industrial unions declined sharply over our sample period, while unions in at least some of the service-producing sectors held their own.
Past Research on Union Effects on Nonunion Wages at the City Level
As is the case in the existing literature testing the alternative models at the industry level, the existing evidence at the SMSA level comes from cross-sectional regressions. Some of this evidence tends to support the threat model, at least for white male workers. Holzer ( 1982) found that the percent organized was positively associated with nonunion wages for young white men, but negatively associated with nonunion wages for young black men. These findings parallel Kahn's ( 1978 Kahn's ( , 1980 results from regressions between the percent organized among all workers in an SMSA and nonunion wages in relatively unorganized industries.~2 Similarly, Freeman and Medoff ( 1984) reported an overall positive relationship across cities, in regressions pooling multiple years (but not including fixed city effects). Evidence providing little support for threat effects at the city level was reported by Hirsch and Neufeld (1987). They controlled for the percent organized in the industry and the S:'viSA in regressions for nonunion wages of individuals. Their results support the threat effect at the industry level, but indictte that SMSA union density has little impact.
Following the Sdlllc kiud of procedure we ust~d in our industrv-kvci ~m<~lysis , we improve on r hL· L''.:isring Sl\ISA-kvcl resc;m~h by cstimatitlg th!· rcLtti\·c srn~ngrh of the threat and crm\·di r1g effects in a p~tncl clara framework that removes biases arising from unmeasured, fixed city characteristics. Just 22 0nc might wonder whether the negatiYe effects of the percent organized on the wages of younger, Ininority nonunion wurkers rcncct crowding, since union workers m;~y be m!lre likely to be substitutes for older, skilled "·orkers. The complements hvpothcsis discussed bel o w Il!aY lwucr explain thcs<: f'indings.
as biases may arise at the industrv level because unions may target firms in relatively high-wage industries for their organizing efforts, biases may arise at the city level because unions mav target firms in high-wage cities.
The Data
The data set used for this analysis is similar to that used at the industrv level. Our procedure for estimating nonunion city wage differentials is parallel to the procedure we used to estimate nonunion industry wage differentials, using the subset of observations on individuals residing in SMSAs identified in the CPS ; 44 SivlSAs are identified, for some or all of the sample years. Nonunion wage differentials arc estimated for each SMSA, for each year in which the SJ\1SA is identified, resulting in an unbalance d panel for the second-stage analysis. As before, we exclude government workers, managers and professionals, and the self-employed, and estimate the wage regressions separately by race, sex, and year. The specifications also include dummy variables for 26 industries, and interactions of each of these with union status. Finally, the specifications include dummy variables for each city, plus in teractions of these dummy variables with union status. The coefficients of the non interacted city dummy variables estimate the nonunion city wage differentials. For the city-level analysis, in contrast to the industry-level analysis, the NLRB, GNP sh2re, and productivity variables are unavailable.
The second panel of the :lppendix table provides summary statistics lor tlH~ SMS/\. data set, n·porting lll C \ll ic\·,, Js <tnd the 
Ri g ht-to-Work States Sa m e as (2) "S tan dard errors a re repone d in parenth eses. WLS estimati o n a llows a sep a rate residu a l variance for each c it y, for the p er iod b e fo re 1983 , a nd for 19 83 a n d after . Th en' a r e 620 observat ions on th e 44 c iti es identifi ed in th e C PS for some o r all of th e yea rs fr o m 19 73 to 1989, excep t whe re oth e r wise noted.
hQmits 3 1 o bse rva ti o n s with n o st:ttc a nd loc a l gove rnm e nt " 'o rk e rs . ' A se p a rate pe r ce nt organ ized ,·a riable is d e fin e d fo r each sub g roup of sta tes ; al l o th er coe fficie nts a r e cons trained to b e th e sa me for a ll sta tes . Seventeen percent of th e o bservation s are in Siv!S As prima ril y in state s wi tb right-to-work laws.
Source: Auth o rs' co mputati on~ based on Curr e nt Populati o n S ttrveys, 197 3-89 .
for es h a dows th e r e gress ion re sults th at provid e evidence of union thr ea t effects predomina ti ng at th e city leve l. Table : Z reports regn~ss ion rt>~tllt s for cq ua tion ( 1) , es timated at th e S:\!SA le ve l. Th e panel data eviden ce rt~gMcl itt g the· efkc t of th e p e rce nt orga ni zed i~ in u)lls iste nt with crowd ing effects pr e domin~tting , but instead ge n erally suggests that thr ea t e ffec ts predominate. This is s hown in ro w (2) where , with c ity effec ts includ ed, th e estim ate d coe ffi c ient of %o Re is p os itive a nd signifi ca nt. In contrast w the indu stryleve l es tim ates, the estim a te d coeffici e nt is not ve ry diffe rent if we omit the fix ed c ity e ffec ts, as row ( 1 ) shows. T h e es tim at e d ma gn itude in row (2) impli e s tha t th e e ffect of a lS perce ntag e poin t d ec line in th e per ce tll organ ized (the ove r a ll average in th e a pp e ndi x tab le) is to r e du ce the n o nuni o n c ity wag e differential by 1.5 % . \Vc next add th e percentage of state <tn d lu c t! ,,·orkers unioni ze d to th e e quat ion , to arLtiy;e un ion thr eat and crO\\·d in g eJ'f'ec ts ste ntmin g from publi c-sector union s, rath e r th an jus t pri vatc-secrOI-uni o n s. Fo r som e obs e rvatio ns , th e pub lic-s ect.or percent organi ;ed cannot be calcu late d, bec ause th e re ar e n o state and loca l wo rk e rs in the sample. Thu s, row (3) fir st rep ea ts th e pre vio u s spe c ifi cat ion for th e subsamp le f'or wh ic h thi s perce nt orga nized can be ca lcuLtte d. Th e es tima tes a rc virtuall y un c h a nged. Row (4) shows tkn the estimat e d coeffici e nt of th e percent organized am ong pllblic-scctor workers is sma ll and in signiricant, and th at the in clus io n of ihi s variable h as no impact on th e es tirnatecl coe fficicn t of th e private-sector p e rcent organize d.
Empirical Results
In rows (5) an d (6), to assess the sensitivity of the r esults tu the fix e d -e ffe c ts assumption, we r eport the one-year and fi\·e-yea r diffe renced estimates rather than withingroup estimates. In both rows, the estimated coeffi c ie n t o f %oRe is still positive, although no longe r sta tisti ca ll y sig nifi ca nt, implying that the inference that thr eat e ffects preclominate at th e c itv level is somewhat fragile.
Row (7) r e purts results instrumenting for %oRe with its Iaggecl value. The instalmental va ri able s proced ur e again res ults in a siza ble in crease in th e standard e rr or of the estimated c oefficient or % cJRC. But the estima te rem ai n s positive and statistically sign ifi can t.
14 Finally , we consider results disaggregate d by states (in which cities are loca ted ) that did and did not have right-to-work law s.~5 Th e city-level results to this point generally suggest that thr e at effects pre dominate. If right-to-work laws redu ce th e thr eat of unionization , we might e xp ec t to find le ss evid ence of threat effects in jurisdi ctions with right-to-work laws. On the other h and, th e results co uld go the oth e r wa)' because 24 \Ve also expkll·,·d 111e sensi1i1·itv uf 1he rt·sult s h )' rccs tilll<ilit lg 1hc SJKc ilicatiull ill r'"'. th e same perc entage of the work for ce uni onized in a right-to-work. state as in a non-ri g ht-to-\ro rk state ma y represent a high e r proportion of uni onized es ta bli shm e nts in the former , since such es tabli shm ents are rnor e likely to h ave nonunion work e rs. The r es ults , reported in row (8) , indi cate that thre at effects predom in a te in both types ofjuri sdictions , and if a n ythin g app ea r to be stronge r in right-to-work states .
T hus, overall, th e city-level results arc consiste nt with threat effects , r a ther th a n crowding effects, b e ing th e pre dominant union e ffect on nonunion wages . Thi s r es ult, in conjunction with the indu stryleve l c r o wding r es ults in Tabl e 1, suggests that within a city th e threat e ffec t is stronger, a nd t he crowding dle ct is weaker, th an at th e industry le \·e l, at least in sofa r as th e threat effec t is ca ptured by the percent organi ze d. This patte rn supports the anecdota l evidence th a t locally orga nized unions in th e service-produ cing sectors create more of a threat effect, within a geograp hi ca l area , than nation a ll y organi ze d indu stri al unions create within an indu stry, at least within our sample period (wh e n industrial unions were in d ec line).
Union Effects on No nunion \Vages Wi t hin and Acro ss Occupations
Our last analys is focuses on union effects on nonunion wa ge s acro ss occ upati ons within an industry. This an a lys is provi de s evidence on an a lte rnative to th e crowding explanation of th e negative eile ct of th e perce nt organi zed o n nununion indu strY w;.tge differential s. This altcrn a ti\'C~ e:-:pbnatinn is based on the compl e m e JJLarit )' of uni on < llld at le:1st ~o mc ll<lillllli()n Ltbt'tr. Cnmplcmentarit\·bc..~t\\C Cll \llliun ~tnd n ollunion bbor G1 1l :~ri~c if :l Ol lUilion \,·u rk. t:Ts ar e e mplo yed by firm s ;tci in g as suppli e rs tu or di stributors for union firm s, or if n o nuni on wo rker s a re employed a longsid e uni o n workers in the sam e firm. Th e c:ompl e rnents h yp o thesis do es not requir e th e abse nce of a nonunion sector that comp etes directl y with the uni o n sec tor. but only that scal e dTects in the nonunion complcn1enrs sector are ~tr onge r than e f-iNDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIO NS REVIE\V fee ls in the nonunion substitute sector.~li If thi s co ndition is mer, th e n an increase in th e p e rcent organized-which, as discussed a bove, is likel y to be associated with a high er union wage-causes a d ec line in output, e nta iling a decl in e in d e mand for comp le m e ntar y nonuni on labor and , h e n ce , a decline in the n o nunion wage. Changes in the percent organ ized in the complements model would thus generate the same predictions as in th e crowding mod e l.~7 However, as the prec e ding discussion makes clear, the compl e m e nts hypothesis foc u ses on demand shifts caused by changes in the percen r organized, in contrast to th e focus of th e c rowding hypothesis on suppl y shifts .
The fact that the crowding and comp lem e nts hypotheses can both exp lain the n egative effect of %oRe in the industryleve l e quations makes it impossible to differ e ntiate them at this leve l. However, the alternative h ypotheses do h ave different predictions for union effects on nonunion wages across occupations. If occ upations are suffi c ientl y different in skill or training requir e m e nts, then labor supp ly crowding e ffec ts ca nnot occur. Thus, cross-occupation e ffec ts isolate effects of the percent organized on wage differenti a ls of nonunion workers whose wages are unlikely to be affected by supply shifts out of the union se c tor. A finding of n egative effects of the p e r ce nt organ ized on nonunion industry 26 Sca l c effec t s h'Ou l d ha ve to dri ve th e complcmciita ri ty , sinc e it S<T II IS im p la u sible: that the pani a l elctstic iti es nf substitu ti o n be tw ee n th ese diffneilt typesof L tbo r~n c IIeg~Iti ,.,. (l·L!m e rm es h 1993).
~7 ( )n th e o ther h :1ncl. the 11"ll>d e l~ co uld in princ iple Lc di s tiiiguisiicd IJ\ the effec t of th e percent o r g~tlli l.l:d tJil IllHlli iiiu!l ,.,,,pl•>,·m ent, which should lw p(l . siti\ t in th<' cr"''di11g "'"d e l. a nd ( m os t lik e ly ) n egati\'t: in th e c or11plnn<:IIts model. \\ 7 e are not ;l\\';tre nfany ev idence tha t ~Iclclresses thi s question at the indu st ry le ve l. O ne P' o h k m is t ha t th e percent urgan izcd is e nd ogenous " it h r es p ec t to n o nunion e mpl oymen t. The cfTcusufthc per ce nt organized on nonunion e mplo yment ha,·c b ee n add resse d at the SMSA level by Ho lze r ( 1 CJ8~) anrl at th e agg r ega te le ve l b)· Pencave l and Hartsng ( 1984) . ln related work, Kahn ( 198 0) and Kahn :tnd Mor imune (1979) c x:tmin cd th e effec ts of rhc p e r ce nt o rga nized on h o ur s and on unemployment.
wage d i ffe r e nLi als across occupations would suggest that com plemcn LHi ry b e tween union and non union work e rs may b e an imp ortant fac tor in the aggrega te indu stryleve l r es ults. In contrast , a findin g o f negati ve effects within occupation s, but not across occ up a ti o n s, wou ld suggest that crowdin g effec ts beucr explain the industry-l e ve l r es ults ofTa ble l .
Past Research
Th ere is lit tic existing evid e n ce o n withinand across-occupation effe cts of th e percent organized o n nonunion wages. Freeman (198 1) fo und that white-co llar workers had hi g h e r fringes in organized plants than in un o rga ni ze d plants. Mitche ll (1980) studi e d time-series eviden ce on c h a ng e s in cleric a l p ay in highly unioni ze d cities, and concluded that employers did not pass union wage gains on to cleri ca l workers. Hirsch and N e ufeld (1987) reported separate c ross-sectional estimates (fo r many years) o f th e relatio nship b e tw ee n the percent organized in the industry a nd nonunion wages for production work e r s in manufacLuring , production work e rs in nonmanufac turing, and nonpr o duction work e rs. The es timated cocfTi c ie n ts of the percent organized were positive and generally significant. But they reporte d no crossoccupation cCfects, nor pool e d r es ults including fixed industry effec ts.
The Data
T o add a tt o tltcT dimen sion to th e c ru ssoccup;:Hi o n :u1al vs is, in this section we add inform a ti o n o n nonunion indu stry wag e diffe r e nti a ls <Jnd the perc e nt organ ized among tn:ut:tgcrs and professionals, in addition to hltw-cnllar and orh c r whit c-cc>lbr work e r s .~' T lti s uccupati o n < ll disaggregation seems lik e ly to at leasr p ar ti a ll y satisfy the re quir cmc tlls of cornpl e m e nLar ity be-li!\ JON EFF ECTS ON N ONlJN I ON WAG ES twee n uni o n a nd n o nuni o n labor, a nd "immunity" from suppl y shills. C le arly , blu ecoll a r a nd eith e r m a n ag e ri a l/ profe ssion a l or o th e r white-co ll a r workers may b e produ c tion complements. Furthermore , workers a r e r e lativel y unlikel y ro rn o ve among th ese se cwrs, e sp ec ia lly be twe e n blue -co llar a n d man ag e ri al/ profess ion a l oc c upations. U npubli shed ub lcs provid e d by the Bure au of Labor Stati sti cs vield th e following figur e s fo r work e rs displa ce d in 1983 and r ee mplo yed in J 988 . Seventy-o n e p e rce nt of those displa ce d fr o m blu e-coll a r jobs wer e r ee mployed in blue-c ollar jobs, while 7% we re r e employe d in man a ge rial / professional jobs, and Sl% '' e r e r e employe d in o th e r white-co ll a r j o bs. Fifty-nin e p e rcent o f th o se di splac e d from m a n ag e rial / profes sionaljobs we re re e mplo ye d in managerial / profe ssional jobs , whil e 7 % were reemplo ye d in blu e-c o ll a r j o b s, and 28% were r ee mpl oyed in oth e r white -c ollarjobs. Fin a ll y, 68% of tho se displa ce d from oth e r white-coll a r jobs we re re e mployed in similar jobs, while 11 % were r e employe d in blu e-co ll a rj o bs , a nd 14% we re r e employe d in man ag e rial / profess ional j o bs. (Th e r emainin g j o bs h e ld by r e e mploye d worke rs are in servic e o c cupation s.)
T h e within-indu stry n o nuni o n diffe r e ntial s are es timate d fr o m the same log wa ge re g ression s u sed for th e industry-level a nalysis. Th e o nl y differ e n ce is th a t all vari a bles are intera cte d with dumm y va ri a bl e s fo r \vhite-co]Jar \\'Or kcr s, :tnd f"o r m a n a gers and pro fession a ls amon g ' ' b ite-collar worke rs (w ho a rc nm,· iJJcltukd ) . Se rvice work e rs a rc omitte d from the a n :1 1Ysis.
Effe cts W ithin a n d Ac nlSS O ccupations (8), <t!ld fo r o th e r whitecolla r work e rs in rows ( 9 ) -( 1 2) . As b efo re, we in c lud e es tim a te s in curpo ra ting fix e d industry (a nd yea r ) effe cts , and rep o rt \J\TLS e stim a tes allowin g fo r indu stry-s p e cific hete r os c e cla sti c ity th a t ca n va ry p r e-and post-1 983 .
Turning fir st to the wttl1Jn-o c cup a ti o n e ffe cts , in row ( 1) we includ e onl y the e ffec t of % o Re LI C ( percent o f blue-c ollar wor ke r s in a n indu stry wh o ar c uni o ni ze d ) on the wage diffe renti a ls o f n o nuni o n blue-c ollar worke rs. Th e within -o cc up :. 1 ti o n e ffe ct o f percent orga ni zed is ne gati ve a nd si g niCicant. An in c r eas e o f o n e perce ntage point in %oRe BC wo uld r es ult i11 a 0 .3% d ec re as e in nonunion , blue-co llar wages. ln row (5) we in clud e onl y th e eff ect o f C;i (; U RG \!P (p e rc ent of man a ge rs a nd pro fe ssi o n a ls in a n industry wh o a re uni o ni ze d ) o n the wage diffe r e nti a ls o f n o nunion manage rs and profess ionals. T h e estim a te d within -o ccupation effe ct is positive and ma rginally signifi cant. In row (9) we re port a similar sp ec ifi cation for o th e r white-co ll a r worke r s, and in this case th e e ffe ct o f %o Re we is positive a nd significant, with the e stimate implying that a de c re a se o f one percentage point in %o Re we would re sult in a 0.21 % de cre as e in nonuni o n wages o f oth e r whitec oll a r work e rs. Th e se r es ults support the thr e at e ffe c t in th e ,,·hite-co llar a nd m a na g e ment a nd profe ssi o nai nJarket , a nd the c rowding e ffe ct in th e blu e-co ll a r rnarket. :HJ It is inte r es tin g th :n th e threa t e ffect is found in th e white-co llar a n cl m a n :1ge m e nt a nd p r ofe ssi o n a l market., wh e re th e p c rc en t onranize d is low but 11~~~ h e ld re la tive lv ,) ! :\u (Jf c nu r., (~. i 1 i~ po~si! J ic 1h :u li 1 (~r . . : is :t C<Hn plc111<~11\s ,Jk c l .,,·itil in ril,· h itt<: -<:"I LH . '' < "~" 1•11 . :tl t h<lll g h this 1\0ll id i>c d il licult l<> dis l ill :~ui.s il fr<>!ll Ih < : ,.,.,"·d-i rlg e iTcc r
In cs titl l~tt c s " •ith <ltl t f iscd indu str \ ,·Jf c cts . t hco CSLim a t c d U\\'11 -UClll fl :lliun t:ffC< .l> <>f I h e pcrCL' lll () rga ni 7.t:< l were p os ir.i,· e fu r IJu rh blt t< "-cu lhr a nd other white -c o llar w o rker s (; tltil<lll gh !lUI fo r n t: tlla gc rial / p r o fe ssi o n ;tl " ·or kcTs ) . Th i> pa r a lle ls 1hc cr oss-stccLi o n al e.. (.08) . 96 WLS , fixed ye ar and industry effects . 97 .51
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Sam e as (l) WLS, fixed yea r effe c ts, one-yea r differences, omi Table 3 show crossoccu patio n e ffects. In t h c "pee i f1 ca ti u n for the ll011Union in dus try wag<.: different ial for eac h occupat ion, th e pe r u :n t organized in each ofthe th r ee oc cu pations is in c luded. In th ese specifications , negative cross-occ upation effects are consistcn t with com pl ements e ffe cts predo min atin g. Row s (2) , (6), and (10) reporrwithin-group estimates. In the regression for th e bl u e-co ll ar indu stry wage differential (row 2), the estimated coeffi c ie nt of %oR.G MP is negative < md significant. In the regressions for the white-co llar and man age ment / professional industry wag e differe ntials (rows 6 a nd 10 ) , th e estim a ted co e fficient s of %o Re 11c arc n e gative, a lthough significant onl y in th e regressi o n for managers and profess ion als. Thus, th ese results a pp ea r to provid e evid e nce of a compl ementary rel at io nship between blue-collar and man age m e n t / professional workers .
The other rows report similar es timates using one-and five-year differ e nces, inste ad of within-group estimates. The evid e nce suggesting co mplcm e n ta ri tv between blue-collar and managem e nt/profess ion a l workers is similar in th ese a ltern at ive estimates , although s tatistic a ll y weak e r for th e five-year differen ces , which may n o r be surprising give n th at fewer obse rvat ions ar e u sed.
In our view, th e re su lts for th e c ro ssocc upati on effe cts provid e evid e n c e th <H n egative union effec ts on nonunion indu stry wages a re partly drive n b y complementarity. The reason is that the negative overa ll industry-leve l effe cts app ear to com e from n ega tive within-and ac ro ss-occupation effects. Sin ce the c ross-o cc upation effects cannot b e co ming from work e rs di splaced from th e union sector, and henc e are not comi ng a bout vi a supply s hifts, J.n ex planation of th e neg ativ e rel atio nship b e tween the p ercen t organized a nd nonunion wages other than th e c rowdin g m odel may J.lso b e need e d.
Conclusions
We h ave estimate d th e: relative: s trength o f union threat and crowding e ffec ts b y in ves ti gatin g (I) within-indu s try, (2) with inSivJSA, and (3) within-indu stry, across-() ccttp~l tion efk cts of' c han ges in th e perce nt () rg;1ni1.e cl o n clut tges in nonuni o n 11·agcs . The exi sting lite r aw re on thre at and crm,·cl-in g effe c ts uses cross-s ectio nal d a ta that iso late the se effec ts acro ss indu s tri es or SMSAs at a point in tim e. Th ese resu lts te nd to support r.hc thr ea t mod e l, esp ec ially at th e indu stry level. A maj o r weakn ess of these re sults , h oweve r , is tint th ey a rc subje ct to bi ases from unmea sured industry or c ity charac teri stics . For ex ampl e, indu stries that have high nonunion wag e diffe r e ntial s may be industr ies with industn· r e nts th at made th e m rip e for uni o nization. A ke y innovation in thi s p a per is to use a pan e l da ta se t of cross-se ctiona l observati ons for th e period 1973 to 1989 . Thi s r esearc h d es ign enabl e s us to tes t for threat and c r owd in g effects within industri es a nd ctu e s across time. Usi n g a fixed-effe cts estim ato r, we attempt to avoid the omitte dvari a ble prob le m inh e rent in the cross-se ction al re s ul ts.
Con trary to the r es ults of c ro ss-sec tional studi es, our industry-l evel r esults r eject the con c lusion that threa t effects a re th e predomi:tant union effect o n n onun ion wages. Although llnion threa ts m ay have been op e r ating at the indu st ry leve l, they appea r to h ave b ee n overwh e lmed b y other forces. vVithin-industry in c r eases in t h e p erce nt organized we re as soc ia ted with de c r eas es in non uni o n indu stry wage differ e ntials. Thi s r es ult is co n sis tent with c rowdin g effe cts pre dominating. At th e c ity leve l, howeve r , o ur r eg ression results indic ate t hat uni o n thr ea t effe cts predominate . The contras ting re sults at the industry and c ity levels a rc consistent with anecdotal evid e nce th at loca ll y o rganiz e d unions in the serviceprodu c ing sec tors crea te more of a threat effec t \\ithin a geogra phical a rea th a n nation a ll v orga nized indu strial union s c r ea te within a n indu stry. Such a pattern see ms espe c ia ll y plausible within our sample periucl , during which industri a l uuion s were in d ec line.
Anothe r inno\'atio n of thi s pap e r is its cx a itliiLHion of occupational cL1ta \\'ithin in dustries. 'We find negJ.ti ve effects of ril e percent o rgani zed amon g blue -col lar 1\ 0 t kc· :-s nn n o nuni on indu s trv 11·ag'> differ e tlii::ls of'!1lanage rs and proLes~ioiJ:ds, :I : I d t wg~t ti , · c effects of th e pe r cent org~~ ni zcd ~llllOng man age rs and profes s ionals on nonunion industry wage diffe rential s of' blue-co llar worke r s. These results su gges t th a t the n ega tiv e effect of the p ercen t orga nized on nonunion w age s at th e itJdu s trv leve l m a \' r eflect not solc lv
c r owdi 1t g e ffec ts, but co mpl e m e n tar iti cs bct1,· e l"l1 union and nonunion lab o r a s well. .13 (.03) .16 .2 7 (_ 16) .35 (.07) .40
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